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I. INTRODUCTION

Legislation reflects the dominant political ideology of the period of its enactment.' However, when ideology is in a state of flux or is undergoing internal
differentiation, the articulation of the values underlying legislation may be more
challenging for legislators than during times of ideological stability. Bad interpretive case law is often the ultimate result when judges are placed in a position of having to divine legislative value preferences. This comment first explores

1. This paper adopts the position that law serves to institutionalize ideological structures formed in the
context of societal interactions, and that legislators are the political instruments through whom this is done.
However, this does not imply that legislators serve only to reproduce passively the ideological mosaic of
the larger society. Rather, notwithstanding their subordinate, mirroring function, the manner in which they
perform their socially determined role is dialectically linked to the course of ideological development in society. For a thoughtful discussion of law as social ideology, see Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1985). This is only one among several competing models of the underpinnings
of legislative behavior. For a discussion of other models, see Farber and Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873 (1987).
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differentiation in liberal ideology 2 and its manifestation in one major piece of
liberal legislation, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Act").' It then focuses
on one case, School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.4 This case potentially
removes most AIDS victims from the protections of the Rehabilitation Act. It
is significant as an illustration of how the failure of Congress to define clearly
the values underlying the Rehabilitation Act and its intended beneficiary classes has led to a case outcome that is fundamentally incompatible with liberal
values. The comment concludes with some thoughts on how sound policy analysis
prior to the enactment of the Act could have averted the ambiguous result of
Arline insofar as AIDS victims are concerned.
II. THE CORE VALUES OF LIBERALISM
Liberalism, as manifested in legislative action, has sought to implement
one of three distinct values. These values are fairness, social utility and compassion.
A. Fairness
"Fairness legislation," as used here, is procedural in its effect and intent,
not substantive.' A commitment to fairness implies only a belief in the desirability of providing a level, competitive field for all relevant political players.
The focus of legislative initiatives motivated by considerations of fairness is

2. For the purposes of this comment, "liberalism" is broadly defined to include all philosophical traditions that are traceable, however tangentially, to classical Lockean philosophy. Thus the definition includes
formalist, communitarian, libertarian, utilitarian, pre-Leninist Marxian and Critical Legal Studies traditions.
For a recent exposition of formalism, see Westen, The Concept of Equal Opportunity, 95 ETHICS 837 (1985).
For an exposition of communitarian perspectives, see A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); M. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). For libertarian
perspectives, see R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). For utilitarian perspectives, see R.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (3d ed. 1986). For non-Leninist Marxian and Critical Legal

Studies

perspectives, see D. KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (1982); R. UNGER,

THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).

3.
4.
5.
6.

29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1973).
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
See infra notes 6-10.

A conceptualization that is similar in connotation is that of "negative freedom" as defined by Isaiah
Berlin. See generally I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). Berlin defines negative freedom as simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. Positive freedom, on the other hand, requires that Government provide the individual with certain necessities. Another

conceptualization that is similar to "fairness" is "formalism" as defined by J.Rawls. See generallyJ. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Compare his definition of "pure procedural justice" ("pure procedural justice
obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure
such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed." Id. at 86.) with our definition of"fairness." Also note the identity between "fairness" as defined
in this comment and "formal equality of opportunity" as defined by R. Fullinwider (there is formal equality
of opportunity when X and Y have opportunity in regard to A so long as neither faces a legal or quasi-legal
barrier to achieving A the other does not face). See R. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY 101 (1980). For explication of similar philosophical positions, see generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980). For a critique of the formal model of liberalism, see M. Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality

and Equal Opportunity: A JurisprudentialAppraisal, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1687 (1986).
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one of creating a system of procedural rules that are outcome-neutral and do
not by their own operation provide competitive advantage to any particular social group. Its focus is not so much on the reallocation of scarce social resources
as on the creation of conditions in which no social group is unfairly prevented
from competing for access to these resources. Civil rights legislation is typical
of legislation motivated by this norm. 7 Its targeted beneficiaries are individuals and social groups who are presumed to be able to function effectively in
a competitive environment, provided that the state guarantees fair rules of competition.
B. Compassion
The values underlying "compassionate legislation" are significantly different from those of fairness legislation, although they have also been fundamental to the liberal perspective. 8 Unlike fairness legislation, compassionate
legislation is primarily substantive rather than procedural. Its avowed purpose
is the reallocation of societal resources from one sector of the population to
another. It is premised on the idea that certain individuals and social groups
are fundamentally limited in their ability to compete on equal terms and are
thus in need of social assistance. Welfare legislation in all its multifarious forms
belongs to this category. 9
C. Social Utility
A third value cluster underlying liberal legislation is labelled "social utilitarianism."" Legislation motivated by utilitarian considerations is similar to
compassion-based legislation in that it is also premised on the belief that the
beneficiary class has innate limitations not shared by the rest of the populace.
However, in this case the beneficiary class is seen as having countervailing
strengths which, if tapped, could add to social productivity. Legislation motivated by utilitarian considerations reallocates societal resources, but with the
expectation that society will receive a substantially greater pay-back in the form
7. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Supp. 1988), which
imposes an obligation to provide equal opportunity in employment.
8. The concept of "positive freedom," see supra note 6, implies the politics of compassion. See C. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRACY THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 105 (1973). Macpherson argues that positive freedom depends on the absence of impediments over and above simple coercion, and as such requires that the
government provide some individuals with some necessities. See also D. RAPHAEL, JUSTICE AND LIBERTY
52-53 (1980) (positive liberty requires the development of individual capacities through aid and training provided
by others).
9. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 290aa-3 (Supp. 1988), which authorizes federal funds for a National Institute
of Mental Health.
10. For an example of the utilitarian standpoint as defined here, see R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPAL (1985). Here Dworkin justifies preferential treatment of minority applicants at the expense of more
qualified non-minority applicants to institutions of higher learning. His justification is that such affirmative
action programs benefit the community as a whole by increasing the number of minorities in the profession,
by potentially raising the level of medical care in minority neighborhoods, and by potentially reducing race
consciousness in American society. Id. at 294-95. See generally Abramson, Ronald Dworkin and the Convergence of Law and Political Philosophy (Book Review), 65 TEX. L. REV. 1201 (1987).
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of productive activity by the beneficiary class.11 The classic example of legisemployers
lation motivated by utilitarian considerations is that which requires
12
to "accommodate" otherwise qualified handicapped employees.
From a normative standpoint the three primal values of liberalism -fairness,13
social utility and compassion-are hierarchically ordered rather than co-equal.
A doctrinally pure liberal society must have a pre-eminent commitment to the
fairness principle, not only because it is historically antecedent to the other two
principles, 14 but also because while within liberalism there remains considerable room for debate on the place and scope of utilitarian and compassionate
principles, there is a clear consensus that procedural fairness is central to the
15
liberal perspective.
Given the diversification of liberal ideology, there is no reason why liberal
legislation should not reflect all combinations of the three value clusters delineated
above. Problems arise, however, when the values underlying legislation are
not clearly articulated, when the beneficiary classes are not clearly defined,
and when logical links between articulated values and legislatively defined
beneficiary classes are not established. Fairness and compassion, for example,
are both venerable liberal values-but they do not mean the same thing. Likewise, racial minorities and retarded citizens deserve the protections of the liberal
state, but no rational purpose is served by not recognizing that their claims for
the protections of the liberal state are based on distinct values. A failure to distinguish between the variety of liberal values and the classes they are designed
to benefit inevitably causes muddle-headed legislation which results in bizarre
16
outcomes when interpreted in the context of litigation. The Rehabilitation Act
11. This "cost-benefit" perspective underlying some liberal legislation is illustrated by a statement by
Congressman Vanik in favor of legislation on behalf of the handicapped:
Education for the handicapped is one of the most cost-effective endeavors the American educational
enterprise has ever undertaken. It costs the State $150,000 for the lifetime of a mentally handicapped
person in an institution, but appropriate educational services for the handicapped can turn a negative
societal contribution into a positive one for the individual and for the whole society.
117 CONG. REC. 45,974 (1971),

12. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982), and implementing regulations, 45
C.F.R. § 84.12(a)-(d) (1987) define accommodation. See infra note 48.
13. See supra notes 6, 8 and 10 and accompanying text for an explication of the concepts of fairness,
utility and compassion.
14. Historically, the Lockean tradition, with its emphasis on the desirability of the minimal state that
guaranteed proceduralrights preceded the Benthamite utilitarian tradition, which advocated a substantive
role for the state. The communitarian and critical legal studies traditions, which programmaticallyemphasize compassionate principles, even though from different philosophical vantage points, are of much more
recent vintage. For exposition of the Lockean tradition, see generally C. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL (1973); for exposition of utilitarianism, see J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (R. Hildreth ed. 1911); for communitarian perspectives, see M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF JUSTICE (1982); for an exposition of the Critical Legal Studies Movement see R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT

(1986).

15. Thus, even the Critical Legal Studies Movement, which lives philosophically at the very outer edge
of the liberal tradition, explicitly pays homage to the "constraints on power" and the "emancipatory" kernels
of classical liberal doctrine. See R. UNGER, supra note 14, and Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal
Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505 (1987).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1973).
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is a good illustration of the consequences of law-making that is not guided by
disciplined ideological analysis.
III.

THE REHABILITATION ACT OF

1973

A. Congressional Policy

The critical element of the Rehabilitation Act, as presently written, provides that "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States . ..shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the par-

ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .. "17 When
the Act was first passed in 1973, "handicap" was defined as any physical or
mental disability which constituted or resulted in a substantial handicap to employment, and a "handicapped individual" as one who could reasonably be expected to benefit from vocational rehabilitation services 8 Thus, to qualify for
the protections of the Act, one in fact had to be impaired. While there is no
legislative history to guide us regarding Congressional intent in 1973, the statutory
wording leads to the inference that utilitarian considerations primarily motivated
this piece of legislation. The intended beneficiary class was recognized to be
limited in its capacity to compete on equal terms. The linkage established between the Act's benefits and the potential for employability of the beneficiary
class suggests that Congress believed that the effect of the Act would benefit
society even as it helped the handicapped. However, in specifying the remedies for handicap discrimination, Congress in 1973 planted the seeds for future
confusion. It provided that the "remedies, procedures and rights" of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would be available to Rehabilitation Act litigants. 19 Title VI prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs on the
basis of race and nationality. 20 The difficulty with this linkage is that the underlying value consideration that motivated the Civil Rights Act was fairness,
not social utility, in that its intended beneficiary class, unlike the handicapped,
was presumed to be able to compete on equal terms if discriminatory obstacles
21
were removed.
The confusion regarding the values the Rehabilitation Act was intended to
serve, only implicit in 1973, became quite explicit as a result of amendments

17. Id. at § 794.
18. 87 Stat. 355, 361; see also S. Re. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1974).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (1982).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). Title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
21. Although recognizing that civil rights statutes and handicap discrimination statutes have similarities,
courts have recognized the crucial differences in underlying congressional motivation. See Wright v. Columbia
Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (admitting some relationship between Title VI and § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act but cautioning against forcing "the kinship to an unwarranted degree of consanguinity").
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to the Act in 1974.22 In 1974, Congress redefined a handicapped person as
anyone who (a) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
such person's major life activities, (b) has a record of such an impairment, or
(c) is regarded as having such an impairment. 23 While the first section of the
definition is not materially different from that provided in the original version
of the Act, the second two sections target beneficiary classes whose social
problems are more similar to those of ethnic minorities than to those of the
handicapped. An enormous stretch in the meaning of words was required to
place these classes within the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, in legislative debate,
it was indicated that a person may be considered "handicapped" for the purposes of the Act even though his "handicap" did not affect job performance or
did not even exist. 24 Further, the philosophy of the Rehabilitation Act was explicitly analogized to that of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25 The analogy is
correct, but only in regard to those perceived as being impaired and those with
a recordof impairment. For instance, a fully recovered cancer patient (a person with a recordof impairment) or an individual with one kidney (if he is perceived as being impaired) is in a status similar to that of a member of an ethnic
minority who is denied employment solely because of an immutable characteristic irrelevant to employability. Because there is no rational basis to believe
that such individuals are limited in regard to their employability solely as a result
of their prior history of illness or present non-impairing physical condition, legislation on their behalf needs to be motivated by fairness considerations, as was
legislation on behalf of ethnic minorities. But social utility and compassion,
not fairness, are the primary value bases of legislation on behalf of those who
are in fact impaired. Policy arguments alone create reason enough to deter discrimination against the physically impaired. But no interest is served by perpetuating the myth that social prejudice is the fundamental problem faced by
the truly disabled in the employment context. To analogize ethnicity to disability at once perpetuates both racism and an insensitivity to the special job-related
needs of the disabled. Sound policy analysis would have resulted in either an
amendment to the Civil Rights Act so as to include those with a record of im22. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
23. Id.
24. 120 CONG. REC. 30,531 (Sept. 10, 1974). Introducing the new definition, Senator Cranston stated:
"The new definition in section 7(B) of the act is meant to include a broader group of handicapped persons
who suffer from discrimination practices in employment, and participation in certain services and programs
even though their handicap may not affect job performance or may even no longer exist."
25. S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 6389-91 (1974). This stated in pertinent part:
"The new definition clarifies the intention to include those persons who are discriminated against
on the basis of handicap, whether or not they are in fact handicapped, just as Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, whether or not the person discriminated against is in fact a member of a racial minority."
Id.
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26
pairment and those perceived as being impaired within its broader protection
or an explicit recognition within the Rehabilitation Act that these beneficiary
classes were sociologically different from the handicapped and that different
value considerations motivated the extension of Rehabilitation Act protection
to them.
In 1978, Congress was faced with the issue of whether a practicing alcoholic was handicapped within the meaning of the Act and thus protected from
employment discrimination. The Justice Department and the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare had interpreted the term "handicapped person"
to include practicing drug abusers and alcoholics. 27 Congress responded by
further amending the Rehabilitation Act so as to specifically exclude practicing
drug addicts from its coverage. 28 In fact, there was no technical reason for
such an amendment, given the Act's requirement that in order to come under
the coverage of the Act a handicapped person must be "otherwise qualified."29
What then explains the amendment? The tenor of the legislative debate suggests that the amendment was a manifestation of the tension between the fairness
and the utilitarian principles that were interlocked in the Act. Those that opposed the amendment were inclined to accentuate the fairness values implicit
in the Act, while those who supported it were more inclined to view the Act
as a piece of utilitarian or compassionate legislation. 30 While the amendment
exposed the tension between the separate value nodes of the Act, it did not resolve
it.

26. In fact, there was an effort in Congress to amend the Civil Rights Act to include all the defined
beneficiary classes of the Rehabilitation Act within the protection of the Civil Rights Act, which would probably
have created more of the policy conflicts that are the subject of this paper. See H.R. 14,033, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 9712 (1972) (introduced by Representative Vanik to "amend the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in order to make discrimination because of physical or mental handicap in employment an unlawful employment practice"); S. 3458, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 11,788 (1972) (similar amendment introduced by Senators Humphrey and Percy). Humphrey insisted that the "civil rights" of handicapped
persons should be affirmed, and that it was the "constitutional right" of the handicapped to be helped to help
themselves. Id.
27. The agencies' interpretation was based on an opinion by the Attorney General in 1977. 43 Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 12 (1977).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). This provides:
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title as such sections relate to employment, such term
[handicapped] does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use
of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in question or
whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse would constitute a direct threat
to property or the safety of others.
29. See supra note 17.
30. Those who opposed the amendment focused primarily on the unfairness of the legislation to the
beneficiary class. E.g., Statement of Senator Randolph, 124 CoNG. REC. 30,322 (Sept. 20, 1978) ("it is
unfortunate that any group of handicapped persons should be singled out for special treatment under the
non-discrimination provisions of the act"). Those in favor of the amendment, however, based their stance
on the need to balance safety concerns against the needs of the handicapped. See H.R. 12467 (1978).
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B. Statute and Implementing Regulations
The implementing regulations of the Rehabilitation Act serve primarily to
provide detailed definitions of some of the key terms in the Act and to provide
concrete examples of who is within its coverage. In doing so, the regulations
reproduce the awkward fit between the values and the defined beneficiary classes
of the Act. It should be recalled that in the three-part definition of "handicapped,"
the first category includes those who have physical or mental impairments which
substantially limit their major life activities. 31 On its face, this language suggests that those who have physical and mental impairments which do not substantially limit their life activities are entirely unprotected by the Act and may
be discriminated against by an employer with impunity. Those who are substantially limited, but only with respect to minor life activities would seem to
be similarly unprotected. The regulations underscore this result. 3 2 Thus, notwithstanding the civil rights-oriented fairness values articulated in the legislative history and the Act, the statute seems to exclude from its protection those
who are least limited in their capacity to work and therefore against whom discriminatory employment action would be least defensible.
It was noted above that the statute also protects those who are "regarded
as having an impairment." 3 3 At first blush this component of the definition
seems to protect those who are not handicapped at all but who are at risk of
prejudicial employment actions because of erroneous negative images of them.
The regulations, however, belie such a broad interpretation by defining an individual "regarded as having an impairment" as one who: a) has a physical or
mental impairment that does not limit major life activities but is treated as having such an impairment; or b) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitude of others
towards such impairment. 14 A careful reading of the regulation will reveal that
this "anti-prejudice" provision cannot be utilized by one discriminated against
who has no impairment whatsoever or is not perceived as having an impairment. Some past or present impairment or a social perception of impairment

31. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
32. In the regulations, "physical and mental impairments" are defined as:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one
or more of the following bodily systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemoic and lymphatic; skin; endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness and specific learning disabilities.
34 C.F.R. § 104.30)(i) (1987). "Major Life Activities" are defined as: "functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 34 C.F.R.
Section 104.3(j)(ii) (1987). "Substantially Limits" has been defined as: "likely to experience difficulty in
securing, retaining, or advancing in employment." See 41 C.F.R. App. Part 60-1.3 (1987).
33. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
34. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(4)(1987).
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remains the absolute precondition for statutory protection. 3 5
C. An Illustration
An illustration may help to clarify the practical inequities that result from
the logic of the Rehabilitation Act. Assume that three individuals -Small, Deaf
and Nimble -apply for a job in a large company that receives federal financial
assistance. Small is a dwarf, Deaf is hard of hearing but can read lips, and Nimble
has a knee ligament injury that prevents him from pursuing his hobby of running ten miles a day. All three are denied employment solely because of the
physical characteristics outlined above, and they initiate a section 504 action.
It is stipulated that the physical characteristics of Small and Nimble are entirely irrelevant to their capacity to perform the jobs for which they applied and
that Deaf can do a good job provided she is placed in an available job slot that
does not require high levels of oral communication. Small will probably not
have a remedy at law. She is not impaired within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, nor does she have a record of impairment. It is also unlikely that
she can establish that she is perceived as being impaired because an employer
could credibly claim that he refused to hire Small not because he believed that
diminutive size was an impairment, but only because he felt that small people
on the job created a bad public impression. Nimble is in a slightly more viable
position. Because of his knee ligament injury, he could make a colorable claim
that he had become the victim of discrimination against his impairment. However,
the employer could reasonably defend on the alternative grounds that a weak
knee ligament does not substantially limit a major life activity or that it limits
only a minor life activity. In either case, it would not be considered an impairment at all within the Rehabilitation Act. If this defense is successful, Nimble
could make an alternative claim that, while his impairment is concededly so
minor that it does not constitute an impairment within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, it is perceived as a major impairment by the employer and
as such is a protected characteristic. On this basis, Nimble could at the very
least avoid a summary judgment. Deaf is the only one in this trio who has a
substantial likelihood of winning. She clearly has an impairment which sub-

35. In fact, the idea that individuals with minor or no impairments are not worthy of statutory protection
was suggested in one Congressional report. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY FOR HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS ACT OF 1979, S.REP. No. 316, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1979). This reads in pertinent part:
An individual with a minor physical or mental condition. . . will not necessarily be within the protection of the definition. Thus, for example, a person with ordinary near-sightedness whose vision
is fully correctable with glasses will not be within the term "handicap", even if an employer incorrectly regards him as handicapped ...
Court cases have similarly made short shrift of litigants who were dismissed on account of minor impairments. See Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (1985) (strabismus [cross-eyed] is not
a protected characteristic); E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980) (impairment
which does not affect general employability is not a protected characteristic).
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stantially limits a major life activity. Given that there are jobs available in the
company which do not require high levels of oral communication, the employer has an affirmative obligation to accommodate her in one of these positions.
The fundamental inequity of this configuration of outcomes is this: Small, whose
physical characteristic is least likely to affect job performance at present or in
the future, is also the least protected from employment discrimination, while
Deaf, whose physical disability is at least arguably of such a nature as to pose
some possible impediment to job performance, has a relatively high level of
statutory protection. The point is not that Deaf should not have protection, but
that the fundamental question in an employment discrimination context should
be whether or not a person is being denied employment for reasons unrelated
to his competence to do the job that he seeks. If the answer to this question
is in the affirmative, it makes little sense to deny him some relief merely because he cannot establish that he is also impaired.
In sum, one who neither suffers from a significant impairment, nor is perceived as being impaired, but has a nonimpairing physical or mental condition
that is the object of public fear or prejudice and that results in employment discrimination, has no statutory protection. Since he is not within the protected
classes of the Civil Rights Act, he cannot sue under its provisions. 3 6 Moreover,
since he does not meet the threshold requirement of actual or perceived impairment, he cannot base a claim on the Rehabilitation Act-or so it would seem.
Does any identifiable social group fall into this legal no-man's land? This ques37
tion had the coloration of an abstract law school hypothetical -until Arline
rather concretely pointed to the AIDS victim.
IV. SCHOOL BOARD OF NASSAU COUNTY V. ARLINE

The message of Arline is that both healthy AIDS virus carriers whose
employment-related problems are rooted solely in social prejudice and severely impaired AIDS victims who have lost all productive capacity have no federal statutory protection. In order to fall within the magic circle of the Rehabilitation
Act, it is necessary to be a moderately impaired AIDS victim.
Arline involved a plaintiff who was dismissed from employment as a school
36. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The Civil Rights Act only protects narrowly defined statutory
groups.
37. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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teacher because she was infected with tuberculosis. 3 8 The central holding of
the case is that an individual infected with tuberculosis is "handicapped" within
the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act if he is also substantially impaired or
perceived as being substantiallyimpairedas a result of his disease. 3 The Court
found to be irrelevant for purposes of defining a handicap the issue of whether
the impairment was contagious. 40 However, the characteristic of contagion may,
in the Court's view, be considered in determining whether a tuberculosis victim was "otherwise qualified" for a job. 41
42
Tuberculosis and AIDS are similar diseases in several significant respects.
First, both diseases are contagious. With both diseases, the risks of infection
are subject to conscious human control- through the avoidance of high risk sexual
and other activities in the case of AIDS and through the minimization of exposure to the infected individual at certain critical times in the case of tuberculosis. Second, both diseases are generally misunderstood and are the objects
of irrational social fears and prejudices. Third, there are wide variations in the
levels of impairment in both the AIDS and tuberculosis victim population. In
the case of tuberculosis, symptoms range from those that are barely perceptible, even to the victim, to severe impairment characterized by fatigue, weight
loss and fever. Similarly, AIDS victims include those who are merely seropositive
and suffer no impairment, those who suffer from AIDS-Related-Complex (ARC)
and from intermediate levels of impairment, and victims of full-blown AIDS,
who are severely debilitated. Absent a particularized inquiry, no determination

38. Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 760 (11th Cir. 1985). Arline taught elementary school in Nassau County, Florida. She was discharged from her job in 1979, after her third relapse
of tuberculosis. She brought suit against the Nassau County School Board and against the school superintendent on grounds that the dismissal was a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Arline's
basic contention was that her susceptibility to tuberculosis made her a handicapped individual within the
meaning of section 504. The district court found for the School Board, reasoning that Congress did not intend the term "handicap" to include contagious diseases. On appeal, the circuit court reversed, holding that
persons with contagious diseases are within the coverage of 504. The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
to consider the question of whether tuberculosis, a contagious disease, may be considered a handicap under
section 504. 480 U.S. 275-77.
39. 480 U.S. 273, 280-86 (1987). Given the facts of this case, the Court found that Arline was actually
impaired, since she had a physiological or respiratory disorder affecting her respiratory system. But the result
would have been the same if Arline had been regardedas having such an impairment.
40. Id. at 282. The qualification is found in footnote 7 of the opinion, which expressly states that the
case does not hold that contagiousness alone is a protected characteristic.
41. Id. at 288. The Court holds that in determining whether an individual handicapped as a result of
a contagious disease is "otherwise qualified", the inquiry should include:
[findings of fact], based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge, about,
a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), b) the duration of the risk (how long is
the carrier infectious), c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and
d) the probabilities that the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.
Id.
42. Brief of the American Medical Association as Amicus Curae in Support of Petitioners at 4-8, School
Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (No. 85-1277) (1987) provides a succinct summary of the
pertinent medical facts of tuberculosis. For a good summary of the medical facts relating to AIDS, see N.Y.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, AcQuIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME: 100 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (1985).
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can be made regarding whether one infected with either AIDS or tuberculosis
is capable of functioning effectively in the employment context. Given these
fundamental similarities between the diseases, it is a fair inference that the logic
of Arline is as applicable to AIDS victims as it is to tuberculosis victims.
Until Arline, the most significant opinion on whether AIDS was a handicap
was a memorandum issued by the Department of Justice. 4 3 The memorandum
was in response to an inquiry by the Department of Health and Human Services. It distinguished between the disabling effects of AIDS and the capacity
of an individual to transmit the disease. The memorandum conceded that the
disabling effects of the disease constituted an impairment and therefore could
come within the protections of the Rehabilitation Act. However, it was argued
that the capacity to transmit the disease was not in itself an impairment and
that as such this capacity was not a protected characteristic. Based on this reasoning, the memorandum concluded that an employer would not run afoul of the
Rehabilitation Act if he decided not to hire an AIDS victim on the basis of a
belief that the worker may be contagious, even if such a belief was unfounded.
Arline undermines, but does not demolish, the thesis of the Department
of Justice. In the body of its opinion, the Court announces that "the contagious
effects of a disease can[not] be meaningfully distinguished from [the disease's]
physical effects. . ...
-"

In a footnote, however, the Court expressly reserves

for another day the issue of whether a carrier of the AIDS virus with no impairment associated with the disease can also be "handicapped." 4" Thus, while
there is little doubt that after Arline an impaired AIDS victim qualifies for protection under the Rehabilitation Act, symptom-free AIDS victims have no such
protection.
Thus, the Rehabilitation Act as interpreted in Arline leaves totally unprotected
the largest and fastest growing sector of the AIDS population- those AIDS victims who are merely seropositive and suffer little or no impairment. Such a
result is directly traceable to the failure of Congress to define clearly the values
of the Act and its intended beneficiary classes. The Act seems to suggest that
at least one of the values it is intended to serve is that of fairness. However,
it defines the beneficiary class of the legislation in a way that tends to exclude
precisely that category of the population in need of fairness legislation-the class
that is not impaired in any way but is prevented from competing effectively
because of prejudicial barriers erected by the larger community.
43. Memorandum of Assistant Attorney General Cooper on Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS (June 29, 1986), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at D-I
(June 25, 1986). For a discussion of the memorandum see Carey, The Developing Law of AIDS in the Workplace, 46 Mo. L. REV. 284, 289 (1987).
44. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
45. Id. at 282 n. 7 ("This case does not present, and we therefore do not reach, the questions whether
a carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairment, or whether
such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined
by the Act.")
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CONCLUSION

Rationalization of social legislation on behalf of the beneficiary classes discussed in this comment may be effected in two alternative ways. One option
involves amendments to both the Rehabilitation Act and the Civil Rights Act. 46
Under this plan the Civil Rights Act would be amended so that its protections
would not be limited to racial, ethnic and national minorities. That Act would
be made to include language which would protect all individuals who can establish that they have been denied employment for any reason unrelated to bona
fide job requirements. At the same time, language in the Rehabilitation Act referring to those "perceived as having an impairment" and those "with a record of
impairment" 47 would be removed since individuals in these categories would
be fully protected by the amended Civil Rights Act.
The second option would leave the language of the Civil Rights Act intact,
in recognition of the particularly pernicious nature of discrimination based on
race and nationality. The language of the Rehabilitation Act would also remain
unchanged. Rationalization of statutory protections would occur through judicial interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, in the exercise of their
inherent equity jurisdiction, courts would interpret the term "impairment"4 8
in the Rehabilitation Act to include any physical characteristicsother than those
related to race, gender or national origin. Such a judicial interpretation of the
term "impairment" is not conceptually elegant, but its practical effect would
be to extend Rehabilitation Act protections to many classes in need of fairness
legislation but not presently protected by the Civil Rights Act.
Either option would result in rational outcomes when applied to AIDS discrimination cases. Under the first option, AIDS victims who are merely seropositive would have available to them the protection of the amended Civil Rights
Act to the same extent as racial, ethnic and national minorities. If the second
option is implemented, AIDS victims who are merely seropositive would not

have the burden of demonstrating that they are "impaired" in order to qualify
for Rehabilitation Act protections. Their seropositivity is a "physical characteristic" and in itself would be sufficient to bring them under the umbrella of
the Rehabilitation Act.
Under either alternative, if the AIDS victim is moderately impaired, the
Court would make a determination regarding his employability solely within
the framework of the Rehabilitation Act and on the basis of utilitarian considerations. While a detailed formulation for making utilitarian determinations in
the context of AIDS is outside the scope of this comment, it is suggested that
it need not depart materially from the balancing approach implicit in established
46. See supra note 20.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
48. Id.
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"reasonable accommodation" doctrine articulated by the courts." If the impairment is severe, the AIDS victim would not be eligible for the protections
of either the Rehabilitation Act or the Civil Rights Act but would be eligible

for public assistance provided in implementation of compassionate principles.
Mahesh Kumar Rao

49. E.g. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979); ("An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap."); see 45
C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1987) (listing factors to consider in determining whether accommodation would cause
undue hardship to an employer). When the handicapped person is not able to perform the essential functions
of the job, the Court must also consider whether any "reasonable accommodation" by an employer would
enable the handicapped person to perform those functions. Accommodation is not reasonable if it either imposes undue financial and administrative burdens on the grantee, or requires a fundamental alteration in the
nature of the program.

